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INTRODUCTION 
Automated risk assessment is all the rage in the criminal justice system. 
Proponents view risk assessment as an objective way to reduce mass incarceration 
without sacrificing public safety. Officials thus are becoming heavily invested in risk 
assessment tools—with their reliance upon big data and algorithmic processing—to 
inform decisions on managing offenders according to their risk profiles. 
While the rise in algorithmic risk assessment tools has earned praise, a group of 
over 100 legal organizations, government watch groups, and minority rights asso-
ciations (including the ACLU and NAACP) recently signed onto “A Shared 
Statement of Civil Rights Concerns” expressing unease with whether the algo-
rithms are fair.1 
Ted Gest, Civil Rights Advocates Say Risk Assessment May “Worsen Racial Disparities” in Bail Decisions, 
THE CRIME REPORT (July 31, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/07/31/civil-rights-advocates-say-risk- 
assessment-may-worsen-racial-disparities/.
In 2016, the investigative journalist group ProPublica kickstarted a 
public debate on the topic when it proclaimed that a popular risk tool called 
COMPAS was biased against Blacks.2 Prominent news sites highlighted 
ProPublica’s message that this proved yet again an area in which criminal justice 
consequences were racist.3 
See, e.g., Max Ehrenfreund, The Machines that Could Rid Courtrooms of Racism, THE WASHINGTON POST: 
WONKBLOG (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/18/why-a-computer-program- 
that-judges-rely-on-around-the-country-was-accused-of-racism/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ce854f237cfe; NPR, The 
Hidden Discrimination in Criminal Risk-Assessment Scores (May 24, 2016, 4:32 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/05/24/ 
479349654/the-hidden-discrimination-in-criminal-risk-assessment-scores; Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better 
at Predicting Crime than Random People, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 187, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ 
archive/2018/01/equivant-compas-algorithm/550646/; Li Zhou, Is Your Software Racist?, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2018, 5:56 
AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/02/07/algorithmic-bias-software-recommendations-000631.
Yet the potential that risk algorithms are unfair to 
another minority group has received far less attention in the media or amongst risk 
assessment scholars and statisticians: Hispanics.4 The general disregard here exists 
despite the fact that Hispanics represent an important cultural group in the 
American population with recent estimates revealing that they are the largest mi-
nority with almost fifty-eight million members, and that number is rising quickly.5 
Antonio Flores, How the U.S. Hispanic Population Is Changing, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 18, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/18/how-the-u-s-hispanic-population-is-changing/.
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This Article intends to partly remedy this gap in interest by reporting on an em-
pirical study about risk assessment with Hispanics at the center. The study uses a 
large dataset of pretrial defendants who were scored on a widely-used algorithmic 
risk assessment tool soon after their arrests. The report proceeds as follows. 
Section II briefly reviews the rise in algorithmic risk assessment in criminal justice 
generally, and then in pretrial contexts more specifically. The discussion summa-
rizes the ProPublica findings regarding the risk tool COMPAS after it analyzed 
COMPAS scores comparing Blacks and Whites. 
Section III discusses further concerns that algorithmic-based risk tools may not 
be as transparent and neutral as many presume them to be. Insights from behavioral 
sciences literature suggest that risk tools may not necessarily incorporate factors 
that are universal or culturally-neutral. Hence, risk tools developed mainly on 
Whites may not perform as well on heterogeneous minority groups. As a result of 
these suspicions, experts are calling on third parties to independently audit the ac-
curacy and fairness of risk algorithms. The study reported in Section IV responds 
to this invitation. Using the same dataset as ProPublica, we offer a range of statisti-
cal measures testing COMPAS’ accuracy and comparing outcomes for Hispanics 
versus non-Hispanics. Such measures address questions about the tool’s validity, 
predictive ability, and the potential for algorithmic unfairness and disparate impact 
upon Hispanics. Conclusions follow. 
I. ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk assessment in criminal justice is about predicting an individual’s potential 
for recidivism in the future.6 Predictions have long been a part of criminal justice 
decision-making because of legitimate goals of protecting the public from those 
who have already been identified as offenders.7 Historically, risk predictions were 
generally based on gut instinct or the personal experience of the official responsi-
ble for making the relevant decision.8 Yet advances in behavioral sciences, the 
availability of big data, and improvements in statistical modeling have ushered in a 
wave of more empirically-informed risk assessment tools. 
A. The Rise of Algorithmic Risk Assessment in Criminal Justice 
The “evidence-based practices movement” is the now popular term to 
describe the turn towards using behavioral sciences data to improve offender  
6. See Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 231, 232 (2015) (“The evidence-oriented model utilizes the best data available from the empirical sciences 
to identify and classify individuals based on their potential future risk of reoffending, and then to manage 
offender populations accordingly”). 
7. Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk Assessments and 
Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 724–25 (2011). 
8. Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 
556 (2015). 
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classifications.9 Scientific studies on recidivism outcomes are benefiting from the 
availability of large datasets (i.e., big data) tracking offenders post-release to statis-
tically test for factors that correlate with recidivism.10 Risk assessment tool devel-
opers use computer modeling to combine factors of sufficiently high correlation 
and to weigh them accordingly with increasingly complex algorithms.11 Broadly 
speaking, “[d]ata-driven algorithmic decision making may enhance overall gov-
ernment efficiency and public service delivery, by optimizing bureaucratic proc-
esses, providing real-time feedback and predicting outcomes.”12 With such a tool 
in hand, criminal justice officials can more consistently input relevant data and 
receive software-produced risk classifications.13 Dozens of automated risk assess-
ment tools to predict recidivism are now available and are quite popular.14 
The utility of risk instruments has attracted energetic support from reputable 
policy centers, namely the Council of State Governments Justice Center,15 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’T, JUSTICE CTR., LESSONS FROM THE STATES: REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND 
CURVING CORRECTIONS COSTS THROUGH JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 6–7 (2013), http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2013/04/FINAL_State_Lessons_mbedit.pdf.
the 
Justice Management Institute,16 the Center for Effective Public Policy,17 the Vera 
Institute of Justice,18 and the Center for Court Innovation.19 News headlines and 
academic literature have also been expounding upon the potential harms and bene-
fits generated by the government’s use of big data to predict the future risk posed 
by individuals.20 
E.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 406–07 
(2015); Crysta Jentile & Michelle Lawrence, How Government Use of Big Data Can Harm Communities, FORD 
FOUNDATION: EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/ 
how-government-use-of-big-data-can-harm-communities/; Sony Kassam, Legality of Using Predictive Data to 
Determine Sentences Challenged in Wisconsin Supreme Court Case, A.B.A. J. (June 27, 2016, 1:07 PM), http://www. 
abajournal.com/news/article/legality_of_using_predictive_data_to_determine_sentences_challenged_in_wisc.
Algorithmic risk assessment tools offer the ability to reduce mass 
9. Faye S. Taxman, The Partially Clothed Emperor: Evidence-Based Practices, 34 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 
97, 97–98 (2018). 
10. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Algorithmic Risk Governance: Big Data Analytics, Race and Information Activism 
in Criminal Justice Debates, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2019). 
11. An algorithm refers to “computational procedures (which can be more or less complex) drawing on some 
type of digital data (‘big’ or not) that provide some kind of quantitative output (be it a single score or multiple 
metrics) through a software program.” Ange´lee` Christin, Algorithms in Practice: Comparing Web Journalism 
and Criminal Justice, BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 2 (2017). 
12. Bruno Lepri et al., Fair, Transparent, and Accountable Algorithmic Decision-Making Processes, 31 PHIL. 
& TECH. 611, 612 (2018). 
13. J. Stephen Wormith, Automated Offender Risk Assessment: The Next Generation or a Black Hole?, 16 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 281, 285 (2017). 
14. See DANIELLE KEHL ET AL., ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE USE OF RISK 
ASSESSMENTS IN SENTENCING 9 (Responsive Cmtys. Initiative, Harvard Law Sch. 2017). 
15. 
 
16. MAREA BEEMAN & AIMEE WICKMAN, THE JUSTICE MGMT. INST., RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT 2 (2013). 
17. CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. POLICY, BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT OF JUSTICE INVOLVED INDIVIDUALS: 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH AND STATE-OF-THE-ART POLICY AND PRACTICE 19 (2015). 
18. Memorandum from Vera Inst. of Justice to Del. Justice Reinvestment Task Force 1–2 (Oct. 12, 2011). 
19. MICHAEL REMPEL, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, EVIDENCE-BASED STRATEGIES FOR WORKING WITH 
OFFENDERS 1–2 (2014). 
20. 
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incarceration by diverting low risk defendants from prison, while targeting greater 
supervision and services to those at higher risk.21 
Many parties presume that algorithmic risk assessment tools developed on big 
data represent a transparent, consistent, and logical method for classifying 
offenders.22 The mathematical character of risk assessment suggests the ability to 
quantify the future and transport it into the present.23 Evidence-based practices 
thereby present a welcome displacement of human instinct.24 Risk assessment 
practices have been heavily oriented to back-end decisions, such as sentencing, 
early release decisions, and post-incarceration supervision.25 More recent attention 
considers the potential benefits that automated risk assessment practices provide in 
pretrial settings.26 
B. Pretrial Risk Assessment 
Algorithmic risk assessment informs such pretrial decisions as deferred adjudi-
cation and bail.27 The basic idea of risk-informed decisions for pretrial purposes 
has a longer trajectory, being first approved by the United States Supreme Court in 
a 1987 opinion. In United States v. Salerno, the Court held that the practice of 
ordering pretrial detention based on an estimate of the individual defendant’s 
future dangerousness is not facially unconstitutional.28 Still, these predictions must 
be taken with care because of the potential consequences to individual rights. 
“Pretrial decision-making involves a fundamental tension between the court’s 
desire to protect citizens from dangerous criminals, ensure that accused individuals 
are judged before the law, and minimize the amount of pretrial punishment meted 
out to legally innocent defendants.”29 
The terminology has changed since Salerno from the vagueness of “future dan-
gerousness” to a more refined perspective of “risk assessment.”30 Risk assessment 
21. See Sarah L. Desmarais et al., Performance of Recidivism Risk Assessment Instruments in U.S. 
Correctional Settings, 13 PSYCHOL. SERVS. 206, 206–07 (2016) (arguing that risk assessment tools are producing 
more reliable results than unstructured risk assessments even with limits on such tools’ effectiveness). 
22. Hyatt et al., supra note 7, at 725. 
23. See M. Roffey & S.Z. Kaliski, To Predict or Not to Predict—That Is the Question, 15 AFR. J. PSYCHIATRY 
227, 227 (2012) (suggesting that risk assessment is “supposedly more objective” as a predictor of future risk as 
compared to psychiatric “predictions” due to its mathematical character). 
24. Alfred Blumstein, Some Perspectives on Quantitative Criminology Pre-JQC: And then Some, 26 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 549, 554 (2010). 
25. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 67–68 (2017) (stating that risk 
assessment tools rely on “factors not necessarily connected to the criminal justice system”). 
26. See Kristin Bechtel et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Pretrial Research: Risk Assessment, Bond Type, and 
Interventions, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 443, 444 (2017). 
27. BEEMAN & WICKMAN, supra note 16, at 3. 
28. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751–52 (1987). 
29. THOMAS BLOMBERG ET AL., VALIDATION OF THE COMPAS RISK ASSESSMENT CLASSIFICATION 
INSTRUMENT 4 (2010). 
30. Cf. KIRK HEILBRUN, EVALUATION FOR RISK OF VIOLENCE IN ADULTS 18–19 (2009). 
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has evolved over the last three decades from unstructured clinical decisions to the 
actuarial form involving algorithmic processing.31 
To improve the fairness and effectiveness of pretrial decisions, behavioral sci-
ence experts encourage officials to use more objective criteria, such as those 
offered by evidence-based risk tools.32 Legal reformers generally welcome this 
practice as well. Risk assessment has become a foundation for the bail reform 
movement by offering a substitute to a long-standing dependence upon monetary 
bail.33 Releasing more defendants who do not pose a substantial risk can alleviate 
the harms that money bail systems disproportionately wreak on poor and minority 
defendants.34 At the same time, reducing the rate of pretrial detention prevents 
other negative consequences to individual offenders, as studies consistently show 
that pretrial detention is correlated with a greater likelihood of a guilty plea, a lon-
ger sentence, job loss, family disruption, and violent victimization in jail.35 
Notwithstanding the broad support and high hopes for algorithmic risk assess-
ment practices in criminal justice, an investigative report publicized in 2016 called 
into question their objectivity and fairness. 
C. The ProPublica Study 
News journalists at ProPublica reported on statistical analyses the group had 
conducted involving a real dataset and a popular risk tool named COMPAS – the 
acronym for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanctions. ProPublica investigators obtained through Freedom of Information Act 
requests the data on over 7,000 arrestees who were scored on COMPAS in a pre-
trial setting in a southern county of Florida.36 
Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/ 
machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.
ProPublica concluded that COMPAS 
discriminates against Blacks because its algorithm produced a much higher false 
positive rate for Blacks than Whites, meaning that it overpredicted high risk for 
Blacks.37 
COMPAS’s corporate owner, Northpointe, quickly rejected such characteriza-
tion.38 After running their own statistical analyses on the same dataset ProPublica 
31. See Klingele, supra note 8, at 551–67. 
32. See Arthur Rizer & Caleb Watney, Artificial Intelligence Can Make Our Jail System More Efficient, 
Equitable and Just, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 181, 184 (2018) (noting the potential benefits that artificial 
intelligence capacities could bring to the criminal justice system). 
33. Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 319–20 (2018). 
34. John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail 
Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1769 (2018). 
35. Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1320–21 (2012). 
36. 
 
37. Id. 
38. Northpointe re-branded with the trade name “equivant” (lower case intended) in January 2017. Press 
Release, equivant, Courtview, Constellation & Northpointe Re-brand to equivant (Jan. 9, 2017). 
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had compiled, Northpointe statisticians asserted that their results demonstrated 
COMPAS outcomes achieved predictive parity for Blacks and Whites.39 
It turns out a rather simple explanation accounts for the dispute: contrasting 
measures of algorithmic fairness. ProPublica touted the false positive rate, while 
Northpointe preferred an alternative measure called the positive predictive value.40 
As will be addressed later below, these measures are not synonymous and offer dis-
tinct, sometimes conflicting, impressions of a tool’s accuracy.41 
II. AUDITING THE BLACK BOX 
For purposes here, a “black-box” tool refers to an algorithmic risk instrument 
which is not transparent about what is input into the software program and/or how 
the outputs are generated and quantified.42 This characterization is more probably 
appropriate in the case of an algorithmic instrument that is proprietary and its 
owner protects information based on a claim of trade secrets.43 
See SARAH TAN ET AL., DISTILL-AND-COMPARE: AUDITING BLACK-BOX MODELS USING TRANSPARENT 
MODEL DISTILLATION 1 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.06169 (stating that black-box models are “typically 
proprietary or opaque”). 
COMPAS, for 
example, is proprietary and its corporate owner declines to reveal its algorithm, 
which likely is a reason for ProPublica’s interest in auditing it.44 
A. Calls for Third Party Audits 
ProPublica’s study certainly brought the issue of algorithmic fairness to the fore-
front in the popular media.45 Questions are being raised in the scientific and policy 
communities that otherwise “reasonable algorithms” may fail to result in fair and 
equitable treatment of diverse populations.46 There is even a new scientific litera-
ture on the topic named FATML, or “fairness, accountability and transparency in 
machine learning.”47 
HARSH GUPTA, CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MACHINE LEARNING 4 (2017), https://osf.io/preprints/ 
socarxiv/9v8js/.
There is some overlap among the FATML goals: 
Fairness can . . . be related to the notion of transparency– the question of how 
much we are entitled to know about any automated system that is used to make or 
inform a decision that affects us. Hiding the inner workings of an algorithm from 
public view might seem preferable, to avoid anyone gaming the system. But with-
out transparency, how can decisions be probed and challenged?48 
39. WILLIAM DIETERICH ET AL., NORTHPOINTE INC., COMPAS RISK SCALES: DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY 
EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY 1 (July 8, 2016). 
40. Tafari Mbadiwe, Algorithmic Injustice, THE NEW ATLANTICS, Winter 2018, at 18. 
41. See infra Section IV.B.3.d. 
42. ROBYN CAPLAN ET AL., DATA & SOCIETY, ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY: A PRIMER 2–3 (2018). 
43. 
44. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761 (Wisc. 2016). 
45. See, e.g., Zhou, supra note 3. 
46. OSONDE OSABA & WILLIAM WELSER IV, AN INTELLIGENCE IN OUR IMAGE: THE RISKS OF BIAS AND 
ERRORS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 19 (Rand Corporation 2017). 
47. 
 
48. Sofia Olhede & Patrick J. Wolfe, When Algorithms go Wrong, Who is Liable?, 14 SIGNIFICANCE 8, 9 (2017). 
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Importantly, no formal mechanism in the law or in the sciences exists to consis-
tently enforce any form of algorithmic accountability.49 Thus, observers call for 
third party auditing, such as that exemplified by ProPublica’s efforts, to engage in 
any form of scientific inquiry that may reveal information about the empirical va-
lidity and fairness of black-box tools.50 Such data will be useful to legal practi-
tioners and policymakers in considering or reevaluating the use of automated risk 
assessment to inform criminal justice decisions which carry significant consequen-
ces for individuals.51 
Moreover, despite the many advantages of algorithmic assessment, risk profiling 
may fail to alleviate all of the harms of mass incarceration as some “scholars are 
suspicious that contemporary extensions of risk assessment and risk reduction will 
likely only reproduce, or may even exacerbate, the injustices of contemporary 
criminal justice policy under a more ‘objective’ guise.”52 For instance, a White 
House Report on Big Data from the Obama administration lauded the public bene-
fits of big data in criminal justice, but also promoted academic research into big 
data systems “to ensure that people are treated fairly.”53 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS, OPPORTUNITY, 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 22–23 (2016), https://obamaWhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/ 
2016_0504_data_discrimination.pdf.
A particularly acute focus is the concern that potential unfairness will likely fall 
predominately on already beleaguered minority groups. “The use of big data ana-
lytics might have disproportionate adverse impacts on protected classes, even 
when organizations do not intend to discriminate and do not use sensitive classi-
fiers like race and gender.”54 Moreover, cross-disciplinary sharing is necessary 
because of difficulties in translation where data scientists are often not trained in 
law and policy, while civil rights experts in turn may not have statistical exper-
tise.55 
Cf. SOLON BAROCAS ET AL., BIG DATA, DATA SCIENCE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 6–7 (2017), https://arxiv.org/ 
pdf/1706.03102 (arguing cross-training of policymakers and data scientists is necessary to ensure ethical use of 
“big data” in fields that implicate civil rights). 
In sum, many are just realizing that big data analytics can create civil rights 
problems,56 such that the “patina of fairness” that otherwise seems to attach to big 
data algorithms may be unjustified.57 Thus, to the extent that justice decisions may 
bring negative consequences upon defendants, it is particularly advisable to study 
whether and how an algorithmic tool disparately impacts protected groups.58 
49. See ROBYN CAPLAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 10. 
50. See Id. at 10–11. 
51. Jennifer Skeem et al., Gender, Risk Assessment, and Sanctioning: The Cost of Treating Women Like Men, 
40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 580, 590 (2016). 
52. Seth J. Prins & Adam Reich, Can we Avoid Reductionism in Risk Reduction?, 22 THEORETICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 258, 259 (2018). 
53. 
 
54. Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48 
CUMB. L. REV. 67, 80 (2017). 
55. 
56. Id. at 1. 
57. Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2017). 
58. MacCarthy, supra note 54, at 67. 
2019]                                           THE BIASED ALGORITHM                                          1559 
B. Black-Box Tools and Ethnic Minorities 
The ProPublica study was concerned with Black minorities. This paper focuses 
on the ethnic minority group of Hispanics. This Article follows the tradition of the 
United States Census Bureau in classifying Hispanics as an ethnicity rather than a 
race.59 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACE AND ETHNICITY (2017), https://www.census.gov/mso/www/training/pdf/ 
race-ethnicity-onepager.pdf.
Importantly, Hispanics comprise a significant proportion of the American popu-
lation, making them a reasonable population to analyze. Plus, reasons exist to sus-
pect that an algorithm may not assess an ethnic minority group very well. 
“[A] transparent, facially neutral algorithm can still produce discriminatory 
results.”60 Even if a particular tool is shown to perform well on its training sample(s), 
it is not advisable to simply transport that tool across to new populations and settings 
because of the potential for risk-relevant differences in offenders and the availability 
of rehabilitation-oriented services that can undermine the tool’s performance.61 
Unfortunately, officials often disregard this advisory. Recent experience informs that 
“the application of risk knowledge is often haphazard: jurisdictions frequently deploy 
pre-existing screening tools in settings for which they were neither designed nor 
calibrated.”62 
Another reason for suspicion is that, despite their disproportionate presence in 
criminal justice statistics, minorities tend to be underrepresented in testing or vali-
dation samples for most risk assessment tools.63 It is unreasonable, though, to 
assume that risk assessment tools will perform as well for culturally diverse minor-
ity groups.64 A risk assessment process that presumes that risk tools are somehow 
universal, generic, or culturally-neutral may well be flawed on the following 
grounds: 
The over or under estimation of risk that can ensue from this process is 
entirely plausible given (a) the potential omission of meaningful risk items 
specific to minority populations, (b) the inclusion of risk factors that are more 
relevant to White offenders, and (c) variation in the cross-cultural manifesta-
tion and expression of existing risk items.65 
For example, a risk tool may yield unequal results for cultural minorities if it fails 
to incorporate or otherwise consider their unique “behavioral practices and expecta-
tions, health beliefs, social/environmental experiences, phenomenology, illness  
59. 
 
60. Chander, supra note 57, at 1024. 
61. See Desmarais et al., supra note 21, at 207 (noting that the “performance of risk assessments may differ as 
a function of the characteristics of the research samples and study designs”). 
62. Prins & Reich, supra note 52, at 260 (internal citations omitted). 
63. Shepherd & Lewis-Fernandez, supra note 4, at 428. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 429. 
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narratives, deviant conduct, and worldview.”66 It is not surprising, then, when risk 
tools are originally normed on largely White samples that at least some studies 
show risk tools provide more accurate predictions for Whites than other groups.67 
Regrettably, relatively few validation studies on ethnic minorities exist.68 Two 
recent validation studies that have included an ethnic minority group may be tell-
ing. The data reported with revalidation studies of the federal Pretrial Risk 
Assessment and the Post-Conviction Risk Assessment tools show that each tool 
overpredicted or underpredicted recidivism for Hispanics for at least a few of the 
recidivism outcomes tested.69 Despite the seeming importance of these findings, 
the authors do not expound upon these results. 
With respect specifically to Hispanic Americans, academics have suggested that 
risk assessment tools may not perform well if they fail to “consider the centrality 
of family, acculturation strain, religiosity, gender role expectations, and culturally 
stoic responses to adversity” unique to this particular cultural group.70 
C. Legal Challenges 
The legal and big data communities are beginning to realize that there may be 
legal implications in terms of disparate impact if algorithmic bias exists.71 One 
commentator, while acknowledging the potential for unfairness in risk assessment- 
led decisions in criminal justice, has suggested that the practice at least is better 
than uninformed judgments about dangerousness and that the adversarial process 
will encourage attorneys to challenge the tools, which may yield improvements to 
the science underlying them.72 So far there is very little evidence of such confron-
tations in the courts. An exception is a 2016 case, in which a defendant protested 
the black-box nature of COMPAS (the same tool in ProPublica’s research and used 
in the study presented herein). 
In State v. Loomis, the defendant claimed the use of COMPAS in his sentencing 
proceeding constituted a due process violation because the software owner’s 
claims of trade secrets prevented him from challenging the tool’s validity or its  
66. Id. 
67. Jay P. Singh et al., A Comparative Study of Violence Risk Assessment Tools: A Systematic Review and 
Metaregression Analysis of 68 Studies Involving 25,980 Participants, 31 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 499, 510 
(2011); Jay P. Singh & Seena Fazel, Forensic Risk Assessment: A Metareview, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 965, 
978 (2010). 
68. T. Douglas et al., Risk Assessment Tools in Criminal Justice and Forensic Psychiatry: The Need for Better 
Data, 42 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 134, 135 (2017). 
69. Thomas A. Cohen & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Revalidation of the Federal PTRA: Testing the PTRA 
for Predictive Biases, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 234, 255 (2019); Christopher T. Lowenkamp, PCRA Revisited: 
Testing the Validity of the Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA), 12 PSYCHOL. SERV. 149, 155 tbl.5 
(2015). 
70. Shepherd & Lewis-Fernandez, supra note 4, at 429. 
71. Osaba & Welser, supra note 46, at 19. 
72. David E. Patton, Guns, Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal Sentencing, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1427, 1456–58 (2011). 
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algorithmic scoring.73 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found against Loomis, but 
with some caveats.74 The majority ruled that any use of COMPAS must come with 
certain written cautions, including warnings regarding the proprietary (hence, se-
cretive) nature of the tool and the potential that it may disproportionately classify 
minorities as high risk.75 The court seemed marginally concerned with the fact that 
COMPAS had never been validated on a Wisconsin-based population. The court 
suggested that more or less weight might be put on a COMPAS score if such a 
localized validation study were to be conducted.76 
In contrast, a very recent decision by the Canadian Supreme Court found the 
lack of a relevant validation study dispositive. In Ewert v. Canada, the defendant, 
an indigenous minority, successfully protested the use of a different risk assess-
ment tool (i.e., not COMPAS) because of the nonexistence of any validation stud-
ies of the tool specifically on indigenous groups.77 The Canadian Supreme Court, 
ruling in Ewert’s favor, determined that without evidence that the particular tool 
was free of cultural bias, it was unjust to use it on indigenous inmates.78 The justi-
ces observed that “substantive equality requires more than simply equal treatment” 
as treating groups identically may itself produce inequalities.79 
Despite the divergence of the rulings in Loomis and Ewert, both courts supported 
the relevance of validation studies appropriate to the underlying population(s) on 
which the tool is to be used.80 According to the 100 plus groups of civil rights and 
defense counsel organizations in their “Shared Statement of Civil Rights 
Concerns,” the stakes are significant.81 
See AFRICAN AMERICAN MINISTERS IN ACTION ET AL., THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK ASSESSMENT” 
INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS 10 (2018), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/ 
criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf (showing over 100 signees). 
“If the use of a particular pretrial risk 
assessment instrument by itself does not result in an independently audited, meas-
urable decrease in the number of people detained pretrial, the tool should be 
pulled from use until it is recalibrated to cause demonstrably decarceral results.”82 
Moreover, this Shared Statement encourages defense attorneys to inspect any risk 
tool to review how it was created, the input factors used, weights assigned to the 
factors, thresholds for risk bins, and outcome data used in its development.83 
The next Section responds to the call for third-party auditing by academics to 
evaluate how a tool may perform on a minority group. 
73. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wisc. 2016). 
74. Id. at 769. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Ewert v. Canada, 2018 S.C.R. 30, para. 66 (S.C.C. June 13, 2018). 
78. Id. at para. 63. 
79. Id. at para. 54. 
80. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 769 (Wisc. 2016); Ewert, 2018 S.C.R., at para. 66. 
81. 
82. Id. at 5. 
83. Id. at 7. 
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IV. EVALUATING ALGORITHMIC FAIRNESS WITH ETHNICITY 
This section presents the results of an original study of the fairness of 
COMPAS, a popular algorithmic risk assessment tool, employing the same real- 
world dataset that ProPublica compiled for its evaluation of outcomes for Blacks 
versus Whites.84 The data and the tool will be briefly addressed. Then, a variety of 
empirical methods will assess the accuracy, validity, and predictive ability of the 
tool and determine whether algorithmic unfairness or disparate impact appear 
present. 
A. The Samples and the Test 
The primary dataset includes individuals arrested in Broward County, Florida 
who were scored on a COMPAS risk scale soon after their arrests in 2013 and 
2014.85 
See generally Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 
2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm (explaining procedure 
used to generate the dataset). ProPublica has generously made the data available for other researchers to access at: https:// 
github.com/propublica/compas-analysis.
Notably, Broward County is among the top twenty largest American coun-
ties by population, thus improving the potential for a large and diverse sample set. 
The pretrial services division of the Broward County Sheriff’s Department has 
been using COMPAS since 2008 to inform judicial determinations concerning pre-
trial release.86 This study uses two subsets of data, one of which tracks general 
recidivism (n=6,172) and the other violent recidivism (n=4,020). The follow-up 
recidivism period is two years. 
COMPAS is a software application widely used across correctional institutions, 
offering a general recidivism risk scale and a violent recidivism risk scale.87 
See NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 2 (2015), http://www.northpointeinc.com/ 
downloads/compas/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf.
The 
general recidivism risk scale contains about two dozen items related to age at first 
arrest, age at intake, criminal history, drug problems, and vocational/educational 
problems (e.g., employment, possessing a skill or trade, high school grades, sus-
pensions).88 
See NORTHPOINTE, COMPAS CORE NORMS FOR ADULT INSTITUTIONS 80 tbl.3.41 (Feb. 11, 2014), https://epic. 
org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/EPIC-16-06-23-WI-FOIA-201600805-WIDOC_DAI_norm_report021114. 
pdf (listing risk factors including employment, possessing a skill or trade, high school grades, and 
suspensions). 
The violent recidivism scale differs in that in lieu of criminal history 
generally it uses a history of violence, and instead of drug problems it incorporates 
factors related to a history of non-compliance (e.g., previous parole violations, 
arrested while on probation).89 
The COMPAS algorithms produce outcomes as decile scores of 1-10 with 
higher deciles representing greater predicted risk. COMPAS then subdivides decile 
84. COMPAS is the “most successful and popular application of machine learning to offender risk 
assessment.” Wormith, supra note 13, at 285 (citing developers using a decision tree model to educate the tool). 
85. 
 
86. BLOMBERG ET AL., supra note 29, at 15–16. 
87. 
 
88. 
89. See NORTHPOINTE, supra note 87, at 38. PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 28 (2015). 
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scores into three, ordinal risk bins: low (deciles 1-4), medium (deciles 5-7), and 
high (deciles 8-10). 
These analyses generally followed the methodology of the ProPublica research-
ers in terms of defining what acts comprise general or violent recidivism, excluding 
cases with missing data, and excluding cases where the individuals were not scored 
on COMPAS in a timely manner.90 
B. Differential Validity Measures 
Validity, while a technical term, simply means the extent to which a test properly 
reflects the concept it is designed to reflect.91 For purposes here, validity asks 
whether COMPAS adequately measures recidivism risk. The term differential va-
lidity applies when test validity varies between groups.92 
Multiple measures related to validity are available to judge the diagnostic and 
prognostic capabilities of an assessment tool. Discrimination reflects how well the 
tool distinguishes higher risk from lower risk (i.e., relative accuracy).93 
Calibration concerns how accurate the tool statistically estimates the outcome of 
interest (i.e., absolute predictive accuracy).94 
A few descriptive statistics of the samples are provided in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Descriptive Statistics (means or proportions) 
90. See generally Larson et al., supra note 85. 
91. MICHAEL G. MAXFIELD & EARL BABBIE, RESEARCH METHODS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CRIMINOLOGY 
127 (2nd ed. 1998). 
92. Christopher M. Berry et al., Can Racial/Ethnic Subgroup Criterion-to-Test Standard Deviant Ratios 
Account for Conflicting Differential Validity and Differential Prediction Evidence for Cognitive Ability Tests?, 
87 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCHOL. 208, 209 (2014). 
93. L. Maaike Helmus & Kelly M. Babchishin, Primer on Risk Assessment and the Statistics Used to Evaluate 
its Accuracy, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 8, 11 (2017). 
94. Id. 
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Figure 1 shows that general and violent recidivism rates are substantially lower 
for Hispanics, twenty and forty-one percent lower than non-Hispanics respectively. 
Decile score outcomes on both scales for Hispanics were also substantially lower. 
Lower mean decile scores for Hispanics can partly be explained by their also hav-
ing lower mean numbers of prior offences as each scale includes factors that count 
criminal history. 
The table also includes a comparison on age and gender as these factors have 
been shown in previous studies to be strong predictors of recidivism.95 Here, test 
comparison results between groups of the average age of offenders and their gen-
der makeup are not statistically significant. Thus, these results generally indicate 
that any differential validity between these groups is not obviously a result of age 
or gender disparities. 
Figure 2 includes statistics to explore the degree (i.e., the strength) of the rela-
tionship between COMPAS scores and recidivism for each scale and compares 
Hispanics with non-Hispanics. 
Figure 2. COMPAS Failure Rates 
The tabular statistics in Figure 2 contain a host of relevant information about 
COMPAS’ performance. 
1. Validity of Risk Bins 
Three rows display actual rates of recidivism by offenders classified in each of 
the COMPAS risk bins of low, medium, and high. The results show both inter-
group and intragroup disparities. Significant intergroup differences in recidivism 
rates occur in the high risk classification for the general recidivism risk scale (57% 
for Hispanics versus 75% for non-Hispanics) and in the medium risk bin for the 
95. See generally David E. Olson et al., Comparing Male and Female Prison Releasees across Risk Factors 
and Postprison Recidivism, 26 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 122, 123, 126 (2016) (listing studies). 
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violent recidivism scale (8% for Hispanics versus 27% for non-Hispanics). Thus, 
these two risk bins perform disparately regarding reoffending based on ethnicity. 
For the non-Hispanics group, actual recidivism rates operate in a monotonic 
fashion as risk bins rise (low-medium-high) with substantively increasing rates of 
recidivism on each scale, thereby exemplifying favorable performance. 
Contrastingly, this is not the case for Hispanics. Highlighted within Table 2, one 
can observe that with the general recidivism scale, the recidivism rate for 
Hispanics is only slightly higher in the high risk bin than the medium bin, with the 
difference not statistically significant. Then with the violent recidivism scale, the 
rate for Hispanics unexpectedly decreases from the low to the medium bins. 
Hence, these measures confirm differential validity in that COMPAS fails to per-
form equivalently for these groups. Indeed, the three risk bin strategy collapses for 
Hispanics. (A two risk bin scheme appears more appropriate for Hispanics 
whereby the medium and high risk bins could be combined for general recidivism 
while a low and medium risk bin combination might better fit the data for violent 
recidivism). 
2. The Area Under the Curve 
The next row in Figure 2 involves a metric called the area under the curve 
(AUC)—it is derived from a statistical plotting of true positives and false positives 
across a risk tool’s rating system.96 More specifically, an AUC is a discrimination 
index that represents the probability that a randomly selected recidivist received a 
higher risk classification than a randomly selected non-recidivist.97 AUCs range 
from 0–1.0, with .5 indicating no better accuracy than chance, and a 1.0, meaning 
perfect discrimination.98 For this statistic, COMPAS decile scores are utilized, 
rather than the ordinal bins. 
Risk assessment scholars often refer to AUCs of .56, .64, and .71 as the thresh-
olds for small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively.99 Using these sugges-
tions, it would mean that COMPAS operates effectively for both groups, albeit at 
disparate magnitudes. The AUCs would represent moderate effect sizes for 
Hispanics and large effect sizes for non-Hispanics. Notwithstanding, agreement on 
the strength of AUCs is not universal.100 A more conservative conceptualization is 
that AUCs between .60 and .69 are poor, .70 to .79 are fair, .80 to .89 are good, and 
96. Jay P. Singh, Predictive Validity Performance Indicators in Violent Risk Assessment, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
8, 15 (2013). 
97. Jay P. Singh et al., Measurement of Predictive Validity in Violence Risk Assessment Studies, 31 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 55, 64 (2013) (stating that 34 percent of “all articles” that use AUC analysis define AUC in this way). 
98. Martin Rettenberger et al., Prospective Actuarial Risk Assessment: A Comparison of Five Risk Assessment 
Instruments in Different Sexual Offender Subtypes, 54 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 169, 
176 (2010). 
99. Helmus & Babchishin, supra note 93, at 12. 
100. Jay P. Singh, Five Opportunities for Innovation in Violence Risk Assessment Research, 1 J. THREAT 
ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 179, 181 (2014). 
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over .90 are excellent.101 Based on these standards, the AUCs for Hispanics would 
be judged as poor and for non-Hispanics as fair. 
Still, the AUC has serious limitations as discussed elsewhere and thus cannot 
present a holistic portrait of a tool’s abilities.102 Unfortunately, the AUC is too 
commonly misinterpreted as measuring calibration accuracy; but a higher AUC 
does not mean more accurate prospective prediction.103 Further, the AUC cannot 
calculate how well an instrument selects those at high risk.104 For example, the 
AUC could be very high even if no recidivists were ranked as high risk. To use a 
hypothetical, the AUC for COMPAS would actually reflect perfect accuracy 
(AUC=1.0) where all recidivists were classified Decile 2 and all non-recidivists as 
Decile 1 (i.e., all were classified as low risk), with very little distinction consider-
ing the decile scale ranges from 1 to 10. 
Importantly, substantial group differences indicated by corresponding z-tests for 
AUCs will reveal the presence of differential discrimination accuracy in terms of 
degree.105 Here, the AUCs indicate that COMPAS is a weaker discriminatory tool 
for Hispanics than non-Hispanics as the AUC measures on both the general and 
violent recidivism tools are lower for Hispanics, and with statistical significance 
(z-tests of the differences in proportions indicate levels of p=.000 and p=.001 for 
general and violent recidivism, respectively). These results on the AUCs are 
another indicator that COMPAS exhibits differential accuracy in its degree of dis-
crimination utility on both scales relative to Hispanic ethnicity. 
3. Correlations 
The final row in Figure 1 contains correlation coefficients representing another 
barometer of the strength of COMPAS decile scores relative to recidivism. Like 
the AUC, correlations test discrimination ability.106 Separate statistical runs (not 
shown in Figure 2) find that each of the four individual correlation coefficients are 
statistically significant at p=.005 or below. These individual correlations thus sig-
nify that the scales achieve some statistical strength relative to recidivism in both 
groups. Notwithstanding, correlation coefficients can signify differential validity 
as well.107 Here, comparing correlation statistics shows that COMPAS scales are 
more weakly associated with general and violent recidivism for Hispanics, and that 
these differences are statistically significant. In sum, this result adds to the cumula-
tive evidence of differential validity for COMPAS regarding Hispanics. 
101. Helmus & Babchishin, supra note 93, at 12. 
102. Singh, supra note 96, at 16–18. 
103. Id. at 16. 
104. Id. at 17. 
105. Anthony W. Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to 
“Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against 
Blacks,” 80 FED. PROBATION 38, 41 (2016). 
106. Helmus & Babchishin, supra note 93, at 11. 
107. Berry et al., supra note 92, at 209. 
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a. Test Bias 
A well calibrated instrument is one that is also “free from predictive bias.”108 
Differential prediction demonstrates group disparities in predictive ability. 
Researchers examining group bias in psychological testing in education have 
standardized a methodology to empirically study it, with the endorsement of the 
American Psychological Association.109 Group bias represents test bias, which 
refers to the existence of systematic errors in how a test measures members of any 
group.110 This gold standard for evaluating test bias involves a series of nested 
models of regression equations involving the test, the group(s) of interest, and an 
interaction term (test*group) as predictors of test outcomes.111 Basically, a regres-
sion analysis is a statistical method to evaluate the relationship between one or 
more predictors with a response (outcome) variable.112 Then, an interaction term 
refers to the product of two predictor variables (here, test and group) to determine 
whether the effect on the outcome of either predictor is moderated by the presence 
of the other (i.e., changes its strength or direction of influence).113 
This nested models method detects group differences in the form of the relation-
ship between the test and the outcome in terms of intercepts and slopes114 in order 
to reveal differential prediction.115 The rule of thumb in the psychological assess-
ment field is that a significant group difference in either the intercept or the slope 
represents that a single regression equation for the groups combined will predict 
inaccurately for one or both groups, and therefore a separate equation for each 
group must be considered.116 Unequal intercepts or slopes also signify disparate 
impact.117 A system that treats persons unfairly suggests disparate impact may be 
present without requiring evidence of any discriminatory intent.118 Selected 
108. Alexandria Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism 
Prediction Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153, 154 (2017) (emphasis in original). 
109. Nathan R. Kuncel & Davide M. Kleiger, Predictive Bias in Work and Educational Settings, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PERSONNEL ASSESSMENT 462, 463 (Neil Schmitt ed., 2012) (confirming endorsements 
also from the National Council on Measurement in Education and the American Educational Research 
Association). 
110. Adam W. Meade & Michael Fetzer, Test Bias, Differential Prediction, and a Revised Approach for 
Determining the Suitability of a Predictor in a Selection Context, 12 ORG. RES. METHODS 738, 738 (2009). 
111. Jeanne A. Teresi & Richard N. Jones, Bias in Psychological Assessment and Other Measures, in APA 
HANDBOOK OF TESTING AND ASSESSMENT IN PSYCHOLOGY 139, 144 (vol. 1 2013). 
112. RONET D. BACHMAN & RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, STATISTICS FOR CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
675 (1997). 
113. JAMES JACCARD, INTERACTION EFFECTS IN LOGISTIC REGRESSION 12 (2001). 
114. Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Race, Risk, and Recidivism: Predictive Bias and 
Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 692 (2016). 
115. Meade & Fetzer, supra note 110, at 740. 
116. Cecil R. Reynolds & Lisa A. Suzuki, Bias in Psychological Assessment: An Empirical Review and 
Recommendations, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 82, 101 (Irving B. Weiner ed., 2003). 
117. Meade & Fetzer, supra note 110, at 741. 
118. See Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 121–22 (2017) 
(explaining how different reports have shown unintentional bias). 
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researchers in criminal justice have recently begun to apply this methodological 
practice of nested models to evaluate group bias in recidivism risk tools.119 
The nested model structure here utilized variables labeled as Hispanic (coded as 
Hispanic=1, non-Hispanic=0), the COMPAS decile score, and an interaction 
between them as Hispanic*COMPAS decile score. A four model structure is 
employed with the outcome variable being recidivism. Model 1 tests only the 
Hispanic variable; Model 2 tests just COMPAS Decile score; Model 3 includes 
both the Hispanic and COMPAS decile score variables; and Model 4 retains 
Hispanic and COMPAS decile score while adding the interaction term. The gen-
eral recidivism model utilizes the COMPAS general recidivism scale while the 
violent recidivism model relies upon the COMPAS violent recidivism scale. 
Figures 3 and 4 provide the relevant logistic regression equation results for gen-
eral recidivism and violent recidivism, respectively. Logistic regression applies 
when investigating an association between one or more predictor variables with an 
outcome of interest that is dichotomous in nature (e.g., recidivist=yes/no).120 The 
logistic coefficients have been translated in the tables as odds ratios for interpretive 
purposes. 
Figure 3. Logistic Regression Predicting the Odds of General Recidivism 
Model 1 indicates that Hispanics are significantly less likely to engage in any act 
of recidivism. Model 2 supports the overall utility of COMPAS for the groups 
combined in that the odds of general recidivism increases 32% for every one unit 
increase in COMPAS decile score. In Models 3 and 4, when adding the decile 
score, Hispanic ethnicity is no longer statistically significant. While the odds are 
119. See Skeem et al., supra note 51, at 585 (applying the aforementioned methodological practice). 
120. See generally FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION 1 (2000) (describing the advantages of using 
dichotomous indicators). 
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less for Hispanics in Model 3, such that there is evidence of overprediction for 
them, it is not statistically significant (p=.380). However, the interaction term in 
Model 4 is statistically significant (p=.015). This means that Hispanic ethnicity sig-
nificantly moderates the relationship between COMPAS decile score and general 
recidivism. As the interaction term is below one, the regression slope is less steep 
for Hispanics, revealing that as the COMPAS score increases, it has weaker influ-
ence on predicting recidivism for Hispanics. In other words, COMPAS does not 
predict as strongly for Hispanics and thus “is not as valid a predictor for that sub-
group.”121 Further, unequal slopes reflect differential test prediction and thus pres-
ent as disparate impact. 
Figure 4. Logistic Regression Predicting the Odds of Violent Recidivism 
With respect to the COMPAS violent risk scale, there are some consistencies 
with the general risk scale just discussed. In Figure 4, Model 1 shows that 
Hispanics are significantly less likely to commit a violent offense. The utility of 
the COMPAS violent recidivism scale generally is supported in Model 2. For every 
one unit increase in the violent decile score, the odds of violent recidivism 
increases by 38%. 
The results here diverge from the regression models for general recidivism in 
two ways. The Hispanic variable in Model 3 remains statistically significant 
(p=.04), meaning that there are discrepancies in the intercepts of the regression 
lines for violent recidivism. The lower intercept means overprediction of 
Hispanics on the violent recidivism scale.122 But as the Model 4 interaction is not 
significant (p=.143), there is no detectable variation in the slopes. 
121. See Christopher M. Berry, Differential Validity and Differential Prediction in Cognitive Ability Tests, 2 
ANN. REV. ORG. PSYCHOL. & ORG. BEHAV. 435, 443 (2015). 
122. See id. 
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In sum, the nested regression models reveal differential predictive validity in 
COMPAS based on Hispanic ethnicity, though the form varies. For general recidi-
vism, there is asymmetry in the slopes, while for the violent recidivism scale the 
problem is unequal intercepts. In both cases, though, differential predictive validity 
is shown and COMPAS can be challenged as presenting unfair and biased algorith-
mic results based on Hispanic ethnicity. Test bias also symbolizes that while 
COMPAS scores may have some meaning within groups, comparisons across 
groups are problematic.123 
One may wonder if these regression models are too simplistic. For example, 
other researchers have found that gender, age, and criminal history are statistically 
significant factors in recidivism risk.124 Because of this, separate regression models 
(not offered herein) were run to include controls for gender, age, and number of 
prior counts. The results were substantially the same: unequal slopes for the gen-
eral recidivism scale and unequal intercepts for the violent recidivism scale. 
b. Differential Prediction via E/O Measures 
An alternative perspective on differential prediction looks to whether expected 
rates of recidivism are the same as observed recidivism rates in action, and that this 
is the case irrespective of group membership.125 Expected rates are generated from 
logistic regression models whereas observed rates are the actual recidivism statis-
tics. We can show the differences by plotting expected rates of recidivism against 
the observed rates at every COMPAS decile score (with expected versus observed 
referred to herein as “E/O”). 
For each COMPAS scale, a single expected rate line was computed using Model 
2 statistics for general and violent recidivism from Figures 3 and 4, respectively. 
The single expected rate line represents the expected recidivism rate at each decile 
score, regardless of group. Two lines of observed rates of recidivism are presented 
(one for Hispanics and the other for non-Hispanics). Figures 5 and 6 provide visual 
bar graphs of these E/O plots for general recidivism and violent recidivism, 
respectively.   
123. See Meade & Fetzer, supra note 110, at 738. 
124. See Nicholas Scurich & John Monahan, Evidence-Based Sentencing: Public Openness and Opposition to 
Using Gender, Age, and Race as Risk Factors for Recidivism, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 36, 37 (2016) (explaining 
that criticism of using these factors has not been based on their failure to statistically correlate with recidivism); 
Jennifer Skeem et al., Gender, Risk, Assessment, and Sanctioning: The Cost of Treating Women Like Men, 40 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 580, 587 (2016) (finding that the difference between genders in PCRA scores “is small, but 
possibly meaningful”). See generally John Monahan et al., Age, Risk Assessment, and Sanctioning, 41 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 191 (2017) (noting that such models might not treat the aforementioned factors accurately 
enough). 
125. Richard Berk, Accuracy and Fairness for Juvenile Justice Risks Assessments, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. 
STUD. 175, 181 (2019). 
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Figure 5. E/O General Recidivism Plots by Ethnicity 
The solid line represents expected recidivism rates by decile regardless of 
grouping. The observed plotting for general recidivism outcomes for non- 
Hispanics moderately tracks the single, expected rates slope. The observed plotting 
for Hispanics, though, does not present a similar shape and, indeed, fails to reflect 
a consistent linear increase in actual recidivism rates as decile scores rise. This 
plotting visually represents differential prediction for COMPAS in the general 
recidivism scale. Figure 5 also graphically depicts accuracy errors for Hispanics. 
Figure 6. E/O Violent Recidivism Plots by Ethnicity 
The plotting in Figure 6 follows the same patterns just discussed for general 
recidivism rates. Notably, the discrepancies are more dramatic. Actual recidivism 
rates of violent reoffending for Hispanics oddly decline from decile 2 to a 0% 
recidivism rate at decile 7, then increase substantially in deciles 8 and 9, before 
plummeting back to 0% in decile 10. Hence, COMPAS violent decile score does 
not have a linear relationship to violent recidivism for Hispanics, thus undermining 
its performance for this group. This visual plotting also confirms differential pre-
diction for COMPAS in its violent recidivism scale regarding Hispanic ethnicity. 
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So far, comparisons of risk bin outcomes, AUCs, and correlation coefficients reflect 
differential validity, while logistic regressions and E/O plots present differential predic-
tion for COMPAS. Some argue that these are not the only appropriate measures of a 
test’s ability to classify individuals, to predict risk, or to reflect unfairness.126 
c. Mean Score Differences 
It was shown earlier that average COMPAS decile scores on the general and vio-
lent recidivism scales significantly varied by Hispanic ethnicity. Yet it is too sim-
plistic to assert that mean score differences signify test bias (even though it 
violates the algorithmic fairness notion of statistical parity127
JON KLEINBERG ET AL., INHERENT TRADE-OFFS IN THE FAIR DETERMINATION OF RISK SCORES 11–12 
(2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05807.
) as there may be 
some risk-relevant differences between groups.128 Still, closely-related fairness 
indices are indicative of differential calibration–group variances in calibration– 
and potentially disparate impact. The algorithmic fairness concept of “balance 
for the positive class” refers to requiring that the mean test score for those in the 
positive class–here, meaning recidivists–be the same across groups.129 
Correspondingly, “balance for the negative class” requires equal mean test score 
for those in the negative class, i.e., non-recidivists. A test is well-calibrated with 
respect to these definitions of algorithmic fairness if a particular score is associated 
with the same likelihood of the outcome occurring, regardless of group member-
ship.130 Figure 7 presents mean COMPAS scores comparing recidivists and non- 
recidivists on both the general and violent recidivism scales. 
Figure 7. Mean Decile Scores 
All four comparisons of mean decile score differences between groups are statis-
tically significant at the level of p=.005 or below. Mean scores for recidivist and 
126. Richard W. Elwood, Calculating Probability in Sex Offender Risk Assessment, 62 INT’L J. OFFENDER 
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1262, 1264 (2018). 
127. 
 
128. Russell T. Warne et al., Exploring the Various Interpretations of “Test Bias,” 20 CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
& ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 570, 572 (2014). 
129. Kleinberg et al., supra note 127, at 2 (emphasis in original). 
130. Chouldechova, supra note 108, at 154. 
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non-recidivist Hispanics are substantially lower than non-Hispanics. Practical differ-
ences exist as well. Mean scores for Hispanics exhibit much less variance between 
the recidivists and non-recidivists in both scales, being approximately one decile 
apart. The means for the non-Hispanics are at least two deciles apart, thus signifying 
greater mean score differences that distinguish non-Hispanic recidivists from non- 
recidivists in scoring to a greater degree. Overall, the metrics in Figure 7 signify a fail-
ure in balances for the positive and negative classes that again indicate algorithmic 
unfairness and disparate impact of COMPAS scoring based on Hispanic ethnicity. 
d. Classification Errors 
Additional computations measuring algorithmic accuracy and fairness are popu-
lar in the behavioral sciences and machine learning literatures. A few of these can 
provide further insight into possible disparate impact, which can occur when accu-
racy and error rates between groups are unequal.131 
The first two are the true positive rate (TPR) and the true negative rate (TNR), 
representing a high risk and a low risk discrimination metric, respectively.132 The 
TPR is alternatively titled “sensitivity in the field of statistics” and represents the 
non-error rate for the recidivists.133 The TNR is alternatively titled “specificity” 
and represents the non-error rate for the non-recidivists.134 
The TPR and TNR are retrospective in nature. Two metrics which more appro-
priately measure prospective predictive accuracy, and thereby are more important 
to practitioners who are interested in the predictive validity of risk tools, are the 
positive predictive value (PPV) and negative predictive value (NPV).135 The PPV 
represents the probability that a high risk score will be correct, i.e., the proportion 
of high risk predictions who were recidivists.136 The NPV then is the proportion of 
those classified as low risk who did not recidivate. The PPV is a high-risk calibra-
tion measure while the NPV is a low risk calibration measure.137 
These calculations require that the sample be divided into two groupings: one 
representing individuals predicted to be recidivists and the other non-recidivists. 
Regarding COMPAS, researchers typically opt to lump together COMPAS’ low 
and medium risk bins into one group, merge the medium and high-risk bins to-
gether, or, for better measure, offer both.138 Figures 8 and 9 include the two differ-
ent cutpoints for dichotomizing the COMPAS general and violent recidivism 
scales, respectively. 
131. GEOFF PLEISS ET AL., ON FAIRNESS AND CALIBRATION 2, arxiv.org/pdf/1709.02012.pdf. 
132. Singh, supra note 96, at 9. 
133. Kristian Linnet et al., Quantifying the Accuracy of a Diagnostic Test or Marker, 58 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 
1292, 1296 (2012). 
134. Id. 
135. Singh, supra note 96, at 12. 
136. ROBERT H. RIFFENBURGH, STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 254 Table 15.13 (2013). 
137. Singh, supra note 96, at 11 Figure 1. 
138. Cf. Flores et al., supra note 105, at 42. 
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Figure 8. Measures for General Recidivism 
In Figure 8, five of the eight comparisons are statistically significant, again con-
firming differential validity and differential prediction. With respect to the True 
Positive Rate, the tool is significantly better at discriminating the recidivists from 
the non-recidivists for non-Hispanics at both cutpoints. Indeed, the general recidi-
vism TPRs for non-Hispanics are approximately 50% and 120% better than for 
Hispanics. The low TPRs for Hispanics are actually quite poor from quantitative 
and qualitative perspectives. For example, at the higher cutpoint (low/medium ver-
sus high) the TPR is only 14%, meaning the test is wrong at least eight out of ten 
times for Hispanics. 
Likewise, the PPV differences show that COMPAS is a better predictor of 
recidivism for non-Hispanics at both cutpoints. For example, at the higher cut-
point, of those that were predicted at high risk of general recidivism, 57% of 
Hispanics were reoffenders while 75% of non-Hispanics were correctly classi-
fied. The PPVs for Hispanics at both cutpoints are also considered poor, indicat-
ing overprediction.139 
Interestingly one need not here choose between the preference of ProPublica 
for the TPR or Northpointe (the owner of COMPAS) regarding the PPV, or 
which cutpoint to use. COMPAS on any of those measures performs far worse 
at predicting recidivists for Hispanics. The results thus suggest algorithmic 
unfairness. 
In terms of identifying non-recidivists, one of the four measures is statistically 
significant. The tool performs modestly better at identifying non-recidivists among 
Hispanics.   
139. See James C. DiPerna et al., Broadband Screening of Academic and Social Behavior, in UNIVERSAL 
SCREENING IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS 223, 235, 239 (R.J. Kettler et al. eds., 2014). 
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Figure 9. Measures for Violent Recidivism 
Similar results are shown for violent recidivism in Figure 9. COMPAS generally 
performs much better from discrimination and calibration perspectives on classify-
ing violent recidivists for non-Hispanics, with one caveat of the PPV at the higher 
cutoff where the PPV was still higher for non-Hispanics but not to a statistically 
significant degree. The violent recidivism TPRs for non-Hispanics are 86% and 
50% better at the lower and higher cutpoints, respectively. The low PPVs for 
Hispanics again support the tendency of the tool to overclassify them. At the lower 
cutpoint, the predictions of violent recidivism for Hispanics were wrong at least 8 
out of 10 times. Then, like the general recidivism scale, the TPRs and PPVs at both 
cutpoints indicate COMPAS achieves weaker accuracy at selecting recidivists for 
Hispanics. One need not choose between the TPR or PPV here: either definition of 
algorithmic fairness indicates unfairness to Hispanics. 
Like the general recidivism scale, the tool performs modestly better at selecting 
violent non-recidivists among Hispanics. 
e. Limitations 
Several limitations of this study should be mentioned. The single site (i.e. 
Broward County, FL) limits generalization of results. This study relied upon 
archival data, and it is thereby possible for there to have been systematic errors in 
data collection that are not observable on secondary data analysis. Recidivism out-
comes were from official records and thus will not include undetected crimes. The 
dataset did not include interrater reliability scores that would confirm the depend-
ability of COMPAS scoring across evaluators and over time. It would have been 
preferable to control for aspects of supervision as pretrial services/conditions may 
moderate reoffending rates, but such an option is also not available in this second-
ary data analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Algorithmic risk assessment holds promise in informing decisions that can 
reduce mass incarceration by releasing more prisoners through risk-based 
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selections that consider public safety. Yet caution is in order where presumptions 
of transparency, objectivity, and fairness of the algorithmic process may be unwar-
ranted. Calls from those who heed such caution for third party audits of risk tools 
led to the study presented herein. This study rather uniquely focused on the poten-
tial of unfairness for Hispanics. 
Using multiple definitions of algorithmic unfairness, results consistently showed 
that COMPAS, a popular risk tool, is not well calibrated for Hispanics. The statis-
tics presented evidence of differential validity and differential predictive ability 
based on Hispanic ethnicity. The tool fails to accurately predict actual outcomes in 
a linear manner and overpredicts risk for Hispanics. Overall, there is cumulative 
evidence of disparate impact. It appears quite likely that factors extraneous to those 
scored by the COMPAS risk scales related to cultural differences account for 
these results.140 This information should inform officials that greater care should 
be taken to ensure that proper validation studies are undertaken to confirm that any 
algorithmic risk tool used is fair for its intended population and subpopulations.  
140. See Meade & Fetzer, supra note 110, at 740–41. 
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